MIRANDA'S FAILURE TO RESTRAIN PERNICIOUS INTERROGATION PRACTICES
We lsh S. White* As Ya le Kamisar's writings on police interrogation demonstrate,1 our simultaneous commitments to promoting law enforcement's inter est in obtaining confessions and to protecting individuals from over reaching interrogation practices have created a nearly irreconcilable tension. If the police must be granted authority to engage in effective questioning of suspects, it will obviously be difficult to insure that "the terrible engine of the criminal law ... not ... be used to overreach in dividuals who stand helpless against it."2 If we are committed to ac commodating these conflicting interests, however, some means must be found to impose appropriate restraints on the police when they en gage in interrogation.
The Warren Court undoubtedly believed that Miranda's safe guards would impose significant restraints on the police, ensuring that suspects subjected to custodial interrogation would not only be in formed of their constitutional rights but also protected against coer cive interrogation practices. Indeed, when Miranda was decided, it was widely believed that the Court had imposed inordinate restraints on the police. In his Miranda dissent, Justice White asserted that there was "every reason to believe that a good many criminal defendants who otherwise would have been convicted on what this Court has pre viously thought to be the most satisfactory kind of evidence will now ... either not be tried at all or will be acquitted."3
Other commentators went further, even suggesting that the Court's decision would have the effect of "very nearly" eliminating the " 'confession' as an effective ... tool [of] ... la w enforcement."4 Based on their assessments of Miranda's probable impact, conservative crit ics generally had no doubt that Miranda should be overruled,5 a view that precipitated 18 U.S.C. § 3501, the statute considered in Dickerson.6 By the time the Rehnquist Court decided Dickerson· more than thirty years later, however, conservatives' perception of Miranda had fundamentally changed. In a revealing portion of the Dickerson opin ion, Justice Rehnquist seemed to indicate that the Court would not "agree with Miranda's reasoning and resulting rule" if it "were ... ad dressing the issue in the first instance."7 In upholding Miranda against constitutional attack, however, he stated that "principles of stare deci sis weigh heavily against overruling it now."8
But if a majority of the Court disagreed with Miranda's constitu tional holding, why should it reject an opportunity to overrule or at least modify the Warren Court's landmark decision? As the majority itself acknowledged,9 stare decisis has not been an impediment to over ruling other constitutional decisions, Did the Dickerson Court refuse to consider overruling Miranda's constitutional holding simply be cause, as Justice Rehnquist put it, the Miranda "warnings have be come part of our national culture?"10 Or did Miranda survive because the Court considered the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 "at the very moment when the [C]ourt's interest in protecting its constitu tional turf against'Congressional incursions was at a peak unmatched in recent years"?11
Identifying the motives underlying the Court's decision in Dickerson is, of course, impossible. In my judgment, however, a major reason for the Court's disinclination to overrule Miranda weakened Miranda's protections. Indeed, as interpreted by the pres ent Court, Miranda essentially provides suspects with just two safe guards: first, the suspect will be informed of his four Miranda rights prior to police questioning;13 and, second, the suspect has at least a theoretical opportunity either to avoid or to halt police questioning by invoking his right to remain silent14 or his right to have an attorney present. 15 These safeguards are not insignificant. Although there has been much dispute relating to Miranda's impact on the police's ability to obtain confessions,16 it seems highly likely that, in response to the warnings, a small group of suspects who would otherwise make state ments to the police choose not to speak.17 In addition, the warnings may lead some suspects to invoke their rights at some point during the interrogation, thereby reducing the extent of their incriminating statements. In the great majority of cases, however, suspects respond to the Miranda warnings by waiving their rights.18 Once those rights have been waived, the restraints Miranda imposes on police interroga tors are minimal.
For constitutional purposes, however, the question is not whether Miranda imposes significant restraints on police interrogators. Rather, the question is whether Miranda's safeguards, combined with the Court's other constitutional restrictions on interrogation practices, provide suspects with sufficient protection against interrogation prac tices that should be viewed as pernicious, in the sense that they are abusive, overreaching, or otherwise contrary to societal norms. In ad- (1999) ; Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. Cf. REV. 99, 100.
13. Prior to custodial interrogation, the suspect must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him as evidence, that he has a right to have an attorney present during questioning, and that, if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to represent him. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966) 
14. In Miranda, the Court stated: "If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease." This language was subsequently interpreted in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) . See infra text accompanying notes 27-28. 15. In Miranda, the Court stated: "If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." 384 U.S. at 47 4. This language was subsequently interpreted in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) Thomas III eds., 1998) .
dressing this question, I will consider both the effectiveness of the safeguards Miranda does provide and the significance of the post Miranda Court's nearly total fa ilure to identify pernicious interroga tion practices.
Part I considers the extent to which Miranda's core protectionsinforming suspects subject to interrogation of their constitutional rights and providing them with an opportunity to halt the interroga tion by invoking their rights -protect individuals from pernicious in terrogation practices. Part II considers the significance of the post Miranda Court's fa ilure to identify and to restrain pernicious interro gation practices. Pa rts III and IV then consider some of the ways in which the post-Miranda due process test should be modified so as to provide more effective restraints on such practices. Part III addresses the problem of identifying pernicious interrogation practices. In ad dressing this question, Part III responds to some of Professor Laurie Magid's assertions relating to the ba sis for prohibiting or regulating interrogation practices. In particular, it challenges her conclusion that the existing empirical evidence fa ils to prove that police-induced fa lse confessions are a problem demanding societal attention. It then dis cusses both the proper role of empirical evidence in identifying perni cious interrogation practices and the reasons why interrogation prac tices that are substantially likely to produce untrustworthy confessions should be prohibited. Based on the principle that interrogation prac tices substantially likely to produce untrustworthy confessions should be excluded, Part IV then identifies three police practices that should be prohibited or subjected to close scrutiny. Part V then summarizes the Article's principal conclusions.
I. THE LIMITED EFFECT OF MIRANDA'S CORE PROTECTIONS
In Davis v. Un ited States, 19 the Court stated that "the primary pro tection afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves."20 It added that "[f]ull comprehension of the rights to remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process.
"21
Based on this language, the current Court apparently believes that, in most instances, interrogators' iteration of the Miranda warnings pro vides a suspect with adequate protection from pernicious interrogation practices. If the suspect believes she la cks the resources to deal with the pressures generated by custodial interrogation, she can invoke one of her rights, thereby avoiding interrogation. Moreover, if she decides 19. 512 U.S. 452 (1994 Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986) ).
to waive her Miranda rights but thereafter concludes that her interro gators are subjecting her to undue pressure, she has another opportu nity to invoke one of her rights, thereby halting the interrogation.
In the context of twenty-first century interrogation practices, how ever, the claim that a suspect's awareness of her rights provides an an tidote to the coercive effect of custodial interrogation is either naive or disingenuous. In Miranda itself, the Court said that " [t] he circum stances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators."22 As the length of a custodial interrogation increases, the practical significance of the suspect's knowledge of his rights de creases.
In addition, the practices employed by seasoned interrogators will often have the effect of undermining a suspect's ability or inclination to assert rights.23 Transcripts of modern interrogations indicate that police interrogators are often so overwhelmingly in control of the in terrogation -dictating the pace of the questioning and the topics un der discussion -that the suspect has no practical opportunity to in voke his rights during the most critical parts of the interrogation.24 In addition, the interrogator's ability to connect with the suspectsometimes by establishing a close rapport so that the suspect views the interrogator as a mentor or a fa ther figure25 -often renders the sus pect unable or disinclined to break the connection by asserting his rights. In many cases, the Miranda warnings are therefore inadequate to counteract the pressures generated by sophisticated interrogators.
If a suspect wants to halt an interrogation, moreover, post-Miranda cases make it difficult for him to do so. If the suspect invokes his right 22. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966) . In this quote, the Court was talking about the suspect's right to remain silent. The same point applies, of course, even if the sus pect is given the four Miranda warnings rather than merely informed of his right to remain silent. 25. During Peter Reilly's interrogation, for example, the seventeen-year-old suspect came to view his chief interrogator as a father figure. At one point, he even asked if it might be possible for him to come and live with the interrogator and his family. See JOAN BARTHEL, A DEATH IN CANAAN 98 (1977) .
to remain silent, Michigan v. Mosley26 holds that the police are not re quired to cease the interrogation permanently. Rather, after tempo rarily halting the interrogation, they can resume questioning so long as they "scrupulously honor" the suspect's invocation of his right.27 In practice, therefore, a patient interrogator will often be able to proceed with an interrogation even after a suspect invokes his right to remain silent.28
If the suspect asserts his right to have an attorney present at ques tioning, Edwards v. Arizona2 9 requires police to end the interrogation immediately. Questioning cannot resume until the suspect initiates further exchanges with the police.30 Davis v. Un ited States,31 however, held that, in order to satisfy Edwards, the suspect "must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney."32 If the suspect's statements fa il to meet this test, the police need not even pause for the purpose of clarifying the suspect's position.33 They can simply continue the interrogation,34 perhaps directing their questions to deter or deflect the suspect's re quests for an attorney. Post-Miranda decisions therefore permit the police to interrogate suspects in ways that prevent the suspect's effec tive invocation of his rights.35 26. 423 U.S. 96 (1975) .
27.
Id. , at 103-04 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Hsu, 852 F.2d 407, 410-12 (9th Cir. 1988 ) (holding that po lice "scrupulously honor [ed] " the suspect's right to remain silent even though the same offi cer questioned him shortly after he asserted his right); Maestas v. State, 987 S.W.2d 59, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (holding police "scrupulously honored" the suspect's right to remain silent where the same officer sought and obtained the suspect's Miranda waiver nine hours after the suspect had initially invoked her right to remain silent).
451 U.S. 477 (1981).
30. See id. at 484-85. In Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U. S. 1039, 1043-46 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion), a pivotal plurality of the Court interpreted "initiated" broadly, holding that the police were permitted to resume interrogation when, after invoking his right to an attorney, the suspect said to the police, "Well, what is going to happen to me now?" 31. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
32.
Id. at 459.
33. If, for example, the suspect says, "Maybe I need an attorney," the interrogator could either ignore this comment entirely or say something that might deflect the suspect's interest in having an attorney. As suggested in the first edition of the lnbau Interrogation Manual, he might say, for example, "Joe, I'm only looking for the truth, and if you're telling the truth, that's it. You can handle this by yourself." FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 112 (1962) .
See id.
35. Justice Souter's assessment of suspects subjected to custodial interrogation seems apt: "A substantial percentage of them lack anything like a confident command of the English language, many are 'woefully ignorant,' and many more will be sufficiently intimi dated by the interrogation process or overwhelmed by the uncertainty of their predicament
In practice, therefore, Miranda's core protections provide only minimal safeguards. Police routinely obtain Miranda waivers, and po lice routinely prevent suspects from asserting their Miranda rights during post-waiver interrogations. As the Court stated in Davis, "the primary," if not the only, protection afforded suspects subjected to in terrogation is the information contained in the "Miranda warnings themselves. "3 6 In the context of twenty-first century interrogation practices, however, information relating to one's constitutional rights provides only minimal protection against pernicious interrogation practices.
II. MIRANDA'S FAILURE TO PROHIBIT PERNICIOUS INTERROGATION PRACTICES
As interpreted by the post-Miranda Court, one of Miranda's most striking limitations is its fa ilure to impose significant restraints on po lice interrogation practices. Miranda provides virtually no restrictions on interrogation practices designed to induce Miranda waivers and on interrogation practices employed after waivers are obtained.
Miranda, of course, could have been interpreted to impose such re strictions.37 Miranda itself stated that "the fa ct of lengthy interroga tion ... before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights."38 This language could have been in terpreted to mean that lengthy interrogations are generally impermis sible. The Miranda decision's apparent disapproval of interrogation techniques described in va rious interrogation manuals,39 moreover, could have been interpreted to prohibit interrogators from employing those practices. And Miranda's language imposing a heavy burden of waiver on the government40 could have been interpreted to preclude interrogators from employing interrogation practices that pressure suspects to give up their right to remain silent through pressing them to reveal information they are reluctant to disclose.
But post-Miranda cases have not interpreted Miranda in these ways. Neither the Supreme Court nor any lower court has ever indithat the ability to speak assertively will abandon them." Davis, 512 U.S. at 469-70 (Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted). REV. 2001 REV. , 2008 REV. -20 (1998 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1962); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321-23 (1959) .
48. In Spano v. New Yo rk, 360 U. S. 315 (1959) , for example, the Court expressed disap proval for the deceptive strategy employed by the interrogators, thus suggesting that certain categories of police trickery might constitute improper interrogation practices. In Sp ano it self, however, the Court stated that the trickery employed was simply "another factor which deserves mention in the totality of the situation." 360 U.S. at 323. If the same trickery were employed on another suspect under different circumstances, a lower court could thus prop erly hold that employing the trickery in those circumstances would not render the suspect's confession involuntary.
tainty were naturally inclined to err on the side of law enforcement in terests, employing any interrogation techniques not expressly prohib ited. Lower courts similarly lacked guidelines for applying the volun tariness test and struggled to determine whether particular interrogation techniques were impermissible.
Indeed, the limitations of the pre-Miranda voluntariness test prompted the Court to seek "some automatic device by which the po tential evils of incommunicado interrogation [could] Two factors have contributed to the infrequency with wh ich lower courts find due process violations in post-waiver confession cases. First, lower courts conflate the test for determining a valid Miranda waiver with the test for determining a voluntary confession because the tests are so similar. Both tests require the court to assess the "to tality of circumstances" to determine whether the suspect's action was voluntary.ss Although lower courts generally apply th e two tests sepa rately,s6 some courts appear to equate a finding that a suspect's Miranda waiver was voluntary with a conclusion that her confession was also voluntary. A finding that the police have properly informed the suspect of his Miranda rights thus often has the effect of minimiz ing or eliminating th e scrutiny applied to post-waiver interrogation practices.
Second, the Supreme Court's limited application of the voluntari ness test during the post-Miranda era has probably increased lower courts' natural inclination to disfavor involuntary confession cl aims. During the thirty-year period prior to Miranda, the Supreme Court held confessions involuntary in at least twenty-three cases.s7 In the thirty-four years since Miranda, however, it has held confessions in voluntary in only two cases: Mincey v. Arizonass (1978) and Arizona v. Fulminantes9 (1991) . As Professor Louis Michael Seidman has indi cated, this "silence at the top" has undoubtedly led some lower courts to believe that cl aims of involuntary confessions need not be treated seriously. 60
Miranda's most significant limitation is thus its failure to identify and to prohibit (or even to promote the identification and prohibition these cases (two in 1999 and two in 2000), moreover, this holding was based on state consti tutional law rather than the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
55.
See, e.g., State v. Murray, 510 N.W.2d 107, 110 (N.D. 1994 of) pernicious interrogation practices. Is it appropriate to leave this problem to other institutions, such as legislatures or state courts?61 Based on the Court's interpretation of both the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, "interrogation techniques ... offensive to a civi lized system of justice"62 are unconstitutional . The Court thus has a constitutional obligation to address this issue. In order to fill the gap left by Miranda and the post-Miranda due process test, the Court should formulate rules restricting pernicious interrogation practices.
III. IDENTIFYING PERNICIOUS INTERROGATION PRACTICES
What criteria should the Court use to identify pernicious interroga tion practices?
Professor Laurie Magid argues that the primary, if not the sole, cri terion for determining whether an interrogation practice is permissible is whether the interrogation practice will produce unreliable confes sions. 63 Magid apparently agrees that interrogation practices that cre ate an "unreasonable risk that an innocent person would falsely con fess"64 should be prohibited.
According to Magid, however, the existing empirical evidence fails to establish that police-induced false confessions occur with sufficient fr equency to invalidate any current interrogation practices or to justify additional restraints on police interrogation practices. Specifically, she asserts that the few dozen police-induced false confession cases re ported by commentators such as Richard A. Leo and Richard J. Ofshe65 are insufficient to establish that police-induced false confes sions present a societal problem of sufficient magnitude to demand at-61. Based on prior experience, there is little reason to believe that either state legisla tures or Congress would be likely to address this problem in a way that would provide addi tional protection for suspects subjected to interrogation. The 1968 Congress's response to Miranda's invitation for Congress to provide alternative safeguards for protecting custodial suspects' right to exercise their right to remain silent provides an example of the typical leg islative response. Instead of providing alternative means of protecting suspects' rights, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which was intended to overrule Miranda. See generally Kamisar, supra note 4 (explaining the purpose and legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3501). tention.66 In order to justify additional restraints on interrogation tac tics, Magid would require refinements in the research on false confes sions. According to her, future research "will need to be based on a statistically significant, randomly drawn sample of persons who gave confessions during interrogation."67 If such research indicated that few innocent suspects falsely confessed, additional restrictions on decep tive interrogation practices would be unjustified.68 Both Magid's standard for determining a pernicious interrogation practice and her assessments of the empirical evidence are wrong. In view of Miranda's holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege applies to custodial interrogation,69 Magid's claim that the prevention of unre liable confessions is the sole (or primary) basis for prohibiting interro gation practices cannot be correct. Even if this claim were correct, it would not follow that the frequency with which interrogation practices induce false confessions in typical cases is the criterion for determining whether a problem exists. In my judgment, the empirical evidence suf ficiently establishes both that police-induced false confessions occur frequently enough to create a serious societal problem and that cur rent interrogation practices tend to produce these false confessions.
In supporting my cl aims, I will try to explain both the role and the limitations of empirical evidence in examining police interrogations. In Section A, I will sh ow that reliability cannot be the sole criterion for determining whether an interrogation practice is pernicious. In Section B, I will assess the role of empirical evidence in determining both the frequency of police-induced false confessions and whether that fre quency is socially significant. In Section C, I will consider how empiri cal evidence may be used to assist in identifying interrogation prac tices likely to produce untrustworthy confessions. Finally, in Section D, I will explain why the conclusion that an interrogation practice is substantially likely to produce an untrustworthy confession should be the criterion for determining that an interrogation practice is perni cious and warrants prohibition -even without empirical data to prove that the practice has actually produced false confessions. 69. As Professor Steven J. Schulhofer has observed, Miranda was in fact predicated on "three" holdings. See Steven J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 436 (1987) . The first was that the Fifth Amendment privilege applies to the "informal com pulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461.
A. Contemporary Standards of Fairness Should Determine the Permissibility of Interrogation Tactics
Skilled interrogators could employ even the most pernicious inter rogation tactics in ways that would only produce reliable confessions. Indeed, as early continental systems of criminal procedure recognized, practices involving torture would produce reliable statements if the practices were "employed in such a way" that a guilty suspect would be required to reveal merely details corroborating his guilt. Through the use of non-suggestive questioning, the interrogator could establish the suspect's guilt by forcing him to reveal "information which ... 'no innocent person [could] know.' "70 As Ofshe and Leo have explained,71 modem interrogators can apply a variation of this technique to assess the reliability of suspects' confessions. By analyzing " [t] he fit between the suspect's post-admission narrative and the facts of the crime" the interrogator should be able to determine "whether the suspect pos sesses actual knowledge of the crime" and thus whether the suspect is making a true confession.72 In many cases, therefore, interrogators can ensure that the tactics they employ will only be used to produce reli able confessions.
If, as Magid suggests,73 the sole basis for imposing constitutional restrictions on interrogation practices is to exclude unreliable confes sions, there is no need to prohibit any interrogation practices. Scruti nizing the reliability of each suspect's confession would be sufficient to protect this constitutional interest. If the government could show cor roboration or other circumstances verifying the reliability of a par ticular confession, there would be no constitutional basis for exclu sion. 74
As I have already indicated, however, ensuring the reliability of confessions is not the sole basis for monitoring police interrogation practices. In Miranda, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment ap plies to custodial interrogation.75 In addition, the pre-Miranda due process test barred the government's use of an involuntary confes sion. 76 During the post-Miranda era, the Court has conflated these protections, holding that confessions involuntary under the due proc ess test are also compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment privilege.77
In determining wh ether a confession is involuntary, however, the Court has always examined the interrogation methods employed by the police as well as their actual effect on the defendant. Thus, in Colorado v. Connelly,78 the Court reiterated that "certain interroga tion techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique charac teristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned."79 In assessing the legitimacy of interrogation practices, the focus is thus on the nature of the interro gation practice itself, not on whether the practice appeared to have produced an unreliable confession. Interrogation practices viewed as pernicious based on contemporary standards of fairness should be prohibited.
B. The Role of Emp irical Evidence in Determining Whether Police Induced False Confessions Are a Significant Problem
No one disputes th at police-induced false confessions have resulted in wrongful convictions during the post-Miranda era. Disagreement arises, however, over whether the rate of wrongful convictions is a sig nificant social problem and, if so, whether police-induced false confes sions lead to a significant percentage of all wrongful convictions.
Echoing assertions of Paul Cassell,80 Magid has suggested that the failure to find police-induced false confessions in a random sample of police interrogation cases constitutes strong evidence that police induced false confessions are not a serious societal problem .81 But this suggestion fails to take account of the context in wh ich police-induced false confessions are likely to be found. Th e existing evidence of police-induced false confessions, such as the cases collected by Leo and Ofshe,82 seems to establish that such confessions are most likely to 77. See, e.g. , New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 n.5 (1984) (observing that, in order to show his confession was compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment privilege, the defendant would have to show that "his statement was coerced under traditional due process standards").
479 U.S. 157 (1986).
79. 479 U.S. at 163 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985) REV. 105, 133 (1997) (observing that police-induced "false confessions are most likely to occur in a small but significant category of cases -high-profile cases in occur in high profile cases. In high profile cases, the police are under significant pressure to solve a crime and, because of the magnitude of the investigation, are able to devote an unusually large amount of time to interrogating suspects.83 In contrast, interrogations conducted in low profile cases -the type of case likely to be collected in a random sample of interrogations84 -would be much less likely to produce a fal se confession. In low profile cases, interrogators are generally disin cl ined to expend the time or employ the range of tactics likely to pro duce an untrustworthy confession. Barring unusual circumstances, moreover, suspects in such cases are likely to be guilty,85 thus further reducing the risk of a false confession.86 A random sample of interro gation cases is, therefore, unlikely to resolve the critical questions re lating to the magnitude of the problem of police-induced false confes sions.
Examining a sample of wrongful convictions in high profile or po tentially capital cases, in contrast, could illuminate the extent to which police-induced fal se convictions precipitate wrongful convictions. If one accepts the premise that society should be concerned about wrongful convictions in high profile or potentially capital cases, then a finding that pol ice-induced fal se confessions precipitate a significant proportion of wrongful convictions in such cases should be sufficient to show that police-induced false confessions are a significant prob lem.
Although Magid, Cassell , and others may disagree with me, the apparent number of miscarriages of justice in potentially capital cases seems to me to be sufficiently large to provoke concern.87 Evidence which the police have no suspects other than the one who is subjected to interrogation") (hereinafter White, 85. The leading interrogation manual advises police that they should only use the psy chologically-oriented interrogation techniques designed to elicit a confession when they are reasonably certain that the suspect is guilty. See Fred E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 332 (3d ed. 1986 ). In the typical case, an officer's belief that a suspect is guilty is likely to be correct.
86. If the suspect is guilty, even the most pernicious interrogation tactics will not be likely to produce a false confession because, even if the suspect fe els compelled to admit facts dictated by his interrogators, the essence of the admitted facts -the suspect's commis sion of the crime charged-. will likely be true. indicating that police-induced false confessions account for a signifi cant proportion of such miscarriages of justice would thus indicate that police-induced false confessions have contributed to a significant so cietal problem.
A randomly selected sample of cases involving probable wrongful convictions in potentially capital cases provides a reasonable source for determining the extent to which various causes are likely to pre cipitate such convictions. If it appears that police-induced false confes sions contributed to a significant proportion of the convictions con tained in such a sample, reducing such confessions should properly be identified as a priority of our criminal justice system. Several collections of proven, or probable, wrongful convictions exist.88 In order to determine the extent to which false confessions pre cipitate wrongful convictions, however, the collection should meet several criteria. First, it should be limited to serious cases. Second, it should be large enough so that it is likely to contain a representative selection of wrongful convictions in such cases. Th ird, the collection should be selected so that the most important causes of such wrongful convictions are unlikely to be either under-or over-represented. Fourth, and finally, the causes of the probably wrongful convictions should be identified with sufficient clarity so that it can be determined whether a police-induced false confession played any significant part in precipitating the wrongful conviction. Among the recent collections of wrongful conviction cases, the Bedau-Radelet collection of prob able miscarriages of justices in capital cases89 comes closest to satisfy ing these four criteria.
Bedau and Radelet identified 350 potentially capital cases in which miscarriages of justice90 occurred in America between the years 1900 and 1985.91 In selecting their cases, the authors relied heavily on previ ous research . Consequently, better known and previously researched cases were most likely to be included.92 Because their cases are better RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1346-58 (1997) (summarizing and interpreting studies of false con victions in serious criminal cases). known and have been subjected to more intense scrutiny than average miscarriage of justice cases, their pool does not represent a random sample of miscarriages of justices in potentially capital cases. In addi tion Paul Cassell and Stephen J. Markman have challenged the Bedau Radelet conclusions in 10 of the 350 cases, asserting that the defen dants included in those ten cases were in fact guilty.93
Nevertheless, the Bedau-Radelet pool would appear to provide a representative data set for the causes of miscarriages of justice in po tentially capital cases. Th ere is no reason to believe that better known miscarriages of justice in potentially capital cases resulted from signifi cantly different causes than other miscarriages of justice in similar cases. Th e fact that a small percentage of th ese cases may be inaccu rately cl assified, moreover, would have only a slight bearing on the ex tent to which their sample represents the relevant population. Th ere is no reason to believe that the possible misclassifications are likely to include a disproportionate number of cases involving any particular precipitating causes of wrongful convictions. Consequently, any mis classifications would simply have the effect of decreasing the size of the relevant sample,94 without reducing the validity of generalizations relating to the likelihood of particular causes precipitating wrongful convictions in potentially capital cases.
In fourteen of 350 cases, Bedau and Radelet concluded that the re cord was too slender to provide any basis for determining the cause of the wrongful conviction.95 In the other 336 cases, they concluded that a police-induced false confession was a cause of the wrongful conviction in 49, or 14.3%, of the cases.96 Of the causes that Bedau and Radelet directly linked to the police or prosecution, false confessions ranked third. Only perjury by prosecution witnesses (117, or 34.8%) and mis taken eyewitness identifications (56, or 16.7% )97 accounted for more wrongful convictions. Even if the Bedau-Radelet sample is limited to probably wrongful convictions occurring after Miranda, the percent age of wrongful convictions attributable to false confessions declines by only 3.5 percentage points; 11.4% of the wrongful convictions dur ing the post-Miranda era were found to result from false confessions.98 This figure (11 convictions resulting from perjured testimony and 24.1 % of wrongful convictions resulting from mistaken eyewitness testimony.99
Since mistaken eyewitness identifications are generally understood to be the most frequent cause of wrongful convictions,100 the Bedau Radelet study surprised commentators in finding that the percentage of wrongful convictions resulting from police-induced fal se confessions was comparable to the percentage resulting from mistaken identifica tion witnesses. 101 As Professor Samuel Gross explained in a th oughtful article,1 0 2 the Bedau-Radelet results suggest th at conventional wisdom regarding the causes of wrongful convictions does not necessarily ap ply in capital or other high profile cases. In typical fel ony cases, mis taken identification evidence is much more likely to precipitate wrong ful convictions than police-induced false confessions. In high profile cases, however, where the police have more time to investigate and are under greater pressure to make an arrest, the possibility of a po lice-induced fal se confession is much greater than it is in ordinary cases. In that context, the ch ances of error resulting from police induced false confessions are comparable to the ch ances of error re sulting from mistaken identifications, the cause that in most contexts has been recognized as the most significant precipitator of wrongful convictions.
Th e Bedau-Radelet data does not, of course, establish even a rough estimate of the extent to wh ich police�induced false confessions contribute to wrongful convictions in potentially capital cases. In de termining wh ether a ph enomenon is of sufficient magnitude to war rant societal concern, however, estimating the exact size of th e ph e nomenon is not critical. Wrongful convictions in potentially capital cases may be analogized to a particularly virulent disease. If data showing that about 10 % of the people suffering from a serious disease had been injected with a drug that appeared to contribute to the out break of the disease, for example, this would be enough to provoke concern. Th e existing data suggests that police-induced false confes sions have contributed to producing th e "disease" of wrongful convic tions in about one-tenth of all cases. Although this data is certainly not conclusive, it is sufficient to sh ow that wrongful convictions resulting 101. See, e.g. , Gross, supra note 83, at 485 (observing that the Bedau-Radelet data indi cates that "false confessions are a much more common cause of errors for homicides than for other crimes").
102. See Gross, supra note 83. from police-induced false confessions are of sufficient magnitude to mandate concern.
C. Th e Role of Empirical Evidence in Identifying In terrogation Practices Likely to Produce Un trustworthy Confessions
The common law voluntariness test sought to exclude untrust worthy confessions.103 In applying that test, courts relied on intuition rather than empirical data to identify interrogation practices likely to produce such confessions. Eighteenth-century English courts assumed, for example, that confessions induced by threats or promises were in herently unreliable.104 Based on this assumption, confessions induced by threats or promises were excluded.105
Over the past two decades, scholars have conducted considerable empirical research on police-induced false confessions. As Magid points out, 106 commentators not only have collected cases of proven or probable police-induced false confessions, but also they have carefully examined these confessions to determine why they occurred.107 In identifying modern interrogation practices likely to produce untrust worthy confessions, it thus seems appropriate to rely on conclusions emanating from this empirical data.
In using data to identify interrogation practices likely to produce untrustworthy confessions, however, the focus should be on why false confessions occur and "[h]ow ... such errors [can] be prevented"108 rather than on how often fal se confessions occur or how often par ticular tactics have been shown to produce false confessions. When a particular interrogation tactic played a major part in producing a fal se confession on even a few occasions, such a tactic should be classified as constitutionally suspect.
It remains disputed whether the documented cases of proven or probable police-induced false confessions are aberrations or the "tip of the iceberg"109 -representing evidence of many undetected police- induced fal se confessions.110 But even if there are rel atively few police induced false confession cases in the total universe of cases, a tactic that is shown to have actually produced false confessions in a few cases is capable of producing untrustworthy confessions in all cases.
Barring very unusual circumstances, no interrogation tactic can produce a false confession unless the suspect is innocent.111 Thus, the fact that an interrogation tactic appears to produce many more true confessions than false ones does not indicate whether the tactic is likely to produce trustworthy or untrustworthy confessions. The dis parity between true and false confessions may be attributable to the disproportionate number of the suspects who are guilty rather than the particular tactic's tendency to produce true confessions.
Even a single case in wh ich an interrogation tactic appeared to play a major part in producing a false confession is significant. Barring some evidence that the tactic had a highly aberrational effect on the suspect -perhaps rel ating to the suspect's unusual psychological characteristics -the fact that the tactic caused an innocent person to confess provides strong evidence that the tactic will at least sometimes lead a typical suspect to agree with the interrogator's version of the relevant facts, regardless of her own initial belief in the truth of those facts. The tactic will thus have a tendency to produce false confessions from innocent suspects and true confessions from guilty suspects. If, as appears likely, the tactic's tendency to produce both types of confes sions is substantial, it is proper to conclude that the tactic is substan tially likely to produce untrustworthy statements.
D. Why Ta ctics Substantially Likely to Produce Un trustworthy Confessions Should Be Prohibited
Most responsible members of society would agree with Magid that one standard against which police interrogation techniques should be measured is its propensity to produce untrustworthy statements. If there is a substantial likelihood that the employment of a particular interrogation technique will produce untrustworthy statements, then that interrogation technique should at least be viewed as highly prob lematic. Support for this principle stems not only from our historical concern for guarding against wrongful convictions resulting from government-induced confessions, but also from a strong perception that both guilty and innocent individuals should be protected against the suffering -in terms of both psychological damage and impair ment of autonomy -that results from overreaching or abusive inter rogation practices.
Id.
111. See id. at ll90.
The due process voluntariness test derives from the common law rule that excluded involuntary confessions on the ground that they were untrustworthy.112 Since empirical data shows that modern jurors are likely to give great weight to suspects' confessions, whether or not they are reliable,113 the concern for preventing wrongful convictions based on false confessions is just as great today as it was when the common law rule evolved.114 .
But preventing the production of false confessions is not the sole, or perhaps even the primary, reason for prohibiting interrogation practices that are likely to produce untrustworthy statements. In many cases, the pressure generated by an interrogation technique and the likelihood that the technique will produce untrustworthy statements will be substantially equivalent. As Professor George Thomas has pointed out, in most instances a suspect would not falsely "admit guilt unless she found the pressure to confess overwhelming."115 Accord ingly, an interrogation method likely to produce untrustworthy state ments should be constitutionally suspect regardless of whether its use in a particular case actually resulted in an unreliable confession. The interrogation method is suspect because of the damage it causes to in dividual autonomy, as well as because of its potential for producing fal se confessions. showing that in a mock trial ex periment subjects exposed to various evidence of a suspect's guilt -including identification evidence, circumstantial evidence, and the suspect's confession -were "significantly more likely" to view the suspect's confession as establishing the suspect's guilt than either of the other types of evidence). See generally McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 148, at 316 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972) ("[T]he introduction of a con fession makes the other aspects of a trial in court superfluous, and the real trial, for all prac tical purposes, occurs when the confession is obtained.").
114. The common Jaw rule excluded "involuntary confessions" on the ground that con fessions resulting from certain pressures were untrustworthy. See, e.g. , The King v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 234-35 (K.B. 1783) (explaining that "a confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear" must be excluded because it "comes in so questionable a shape when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it"). See generally White, Fa lse Confessions, supra note 82, at 111-12 (citing other early authorities).
115. George C. Thomas III, Justice O'Connor's Pragmatic View of Coerced Self Incrimination, 13 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 117, 124 (1991) .
IV. REVIVING THE DUE PROCESS VOLUNTARINESS TEST TO REGULATE INTERROGATION PRACTICES LIKELY TO PRODUCE UNTRUSTWORTHY CONFESSIONS
If interrogation practices substantially likely to produce untrust worthy confessions should be prohibited, what new constitutional re strictions on interrogation practices are appropriate? In addressing this question, it is of course difficult to separate interrogation practices from the suspects on which they are employed or the settings in which the interrogations take place. In certain contexts, almost any interro gation practices are substantially likely to produce untrustworthy con fessions.
Thus, for more than three decades, it has been recognized that modern interrogation methods are very likely to produce untrust worthy confessions from mentally handicapped suspects. 1 1 6 Recent empirical data suggests that youthful suspects are also especially likely to make false statements in response to police interrogation.117 Even commentators who are sympathetic toward the interests of law en forcement have recognized the need to provide safeguards against the risk that standard interrogation methods will precipitate untrust worthy confessions from these populations.1 18 Interrogation techniques permissible in other contexts should, therefore, be prohibited when interrogators are questioning youthful or mentally handicapped sus pects.
Similarly, considerable evidence suggests that, regardless of the in terrogation techniques employed, interrogations extending beyond a certain length are likely to produce untrustworthy confessions.119 In 'Y 523, 586 (1999) (observing that special safeguards are needed to protect "mentally retarded" suspects when they are interrogated by the police); Fred E. lnbau, Miranda's Immunization of Low Intelligence Offenders, 24 PROSECUTOR: J. NAT'L DISTRICT ATT'YS, Spring 1991, at 9-10 (observing that youthful and mentally handicapped suspects are especially vulnerable to police suggestion).
119. See generally White, Involuntary Confession, supra note 42, at 2046-49 (discussing empirical data showing that lengthy interrogations are likely to produce false or untrust worthy confessions).
322 U.S. 143 (1944).
Supreme Court provided some protection against lengthy interroga tions. Based on recent empirical data relating to false confessions, however, it appears that interrogations' permissible duration should be shortened considerably. Regardless of the interrogation practices employed, an interrogation should not be allowed to extend beyond some prescribed limit, say six hours.121
In this Part, I will seek to identify interrogation practices that should be viewed as pernicious because of their tendency to produce untrustworthy statements when employed on normal suspects during an interrogation of reasonable length. The fact that interrogators do not generally rely on single tactics in isolation, but rather combine tac tics to enhance the overall effectiveness of an interrogation, has two implications for this analysis. First, in assessing the likelihood that a particular interrogation tactic will produce an untrustworthy confes sion, due regard must be given to the fact that the effect of the par ticular tactic will generally be magnified by the context and manner in which it is used. Second, the fact that interrogators generally employ several interrogation tactics in combination makes it more difficul t to identify particular tactics that are substantially likely to produce un trustworthy confessions. Based on the existing empirical data, it may be difficul t to determine whether the employment of any particular in terrogation tactic would be likely, in isolation, to produce an untrust worthy confession.
Despite these difficulties, it is preferable to establish cl ear princi ples to guide the police and lower courts in determining whether an interrogation tactic is pernicious. If particular interrogation tactics have a strong tendency to produce untrustworthy confessions when employed in the context of a typically intense interrogation, those tac tics should be closely regulated. Starting with this premise, I will con sider three interrogation tactics that have considerable potential for producing untrustworthy statements. The pre-Miranda due process test provided some restrictions on each of these practices. In order to provide appropriate safeguards against the use of these interrogation practices during post-waiver interrogations, however, the restrictions must be revived and strengthened.
A. Th reats of Punishment and Promises of Leniency
At common law, confessions induced by any threat or promise were excluded as unreliable.122 This exclusionary principle was adopted in America during the nineteenth century. In 1896, Russell on Crimes, a leading criminal law treatise, asserted that, in order to be admissible, a confession could not be obtained by any direct or im plied promise.123 One year later, in Bram v. Un ited States,124 the Supreme Court adopted this rule as a matter of constitutional law, holding that the admission of a confession induced by "any direct or implied promise, however slight,"125 violated the Fifth Amendment privilege.
Over the next century, Bram exerted only limited influence. In ap plying the pre-Miranda vol untariness test, the Court never rigorously applied Bram's prohibition. In one case, it held that a confession that occurred after the defendant negotiated "a bargain with the police and the parole officers" was valid;126 in two other cases, it held that confes sions induced by threats of harsh punishment and express or implied promises of significant leniency were involuntary127 but did not specify that the threats or promises were sufficient in themselves to dictate ei ther result.128 In the post-Miranda case of Arizona v. Fulminante,12 9 the Court expressly repudiated Bram's holding prohibiting confessions in duced by any promises, stating that that rule "does not state the stan dard for determining the voluntariness of a confession."13 0
Fulminante's limitation of Bram nevertheless leaves open the pos sibility of barring confessions induced by promises that are substan tially likely to produce untrustworthy confessions. As Wigmore ob served, the premise that confessions produced by any promises are untrustworthy was probably never correct.131 If the inducement to con fess is relatively slight -a promise that the officer will testify that the 128. In Leyra, the interrogator told the suspect he would have "a much better chance" if he "play[ed] ball" with the interrogators, and that "[t]hese people are going to throw the book at you unless you can show that in a fit of temper, you got so angry that you did it. Otherwise they toss premeditation in and it's premeditation. See?" Leyra, 347 U.S. at 583-84 (Appendix to Opinion of the Court). In holding the defendant's confession involuntary, the Court referred to the interrogator's "threat[s]" and "promise[s] of leniency." Id. at 559. In Lynumn, the interrogator told the defendant that if she did not confess she could get ten years and her children would be taken away and that if she did confess the interrogator would recommend mercy and see that she kept her children. 372 U.S. at 531-32. In a terse opinion, the Court held that the interrogator's statements to the defendant rendered her confession involuntary. suspect cooperated,132 for example -there is little reason to believe that a suspect will respond with a fal se confession.
Th e likelihood that a promise will produce a fal se confession is substantially greater, however, when an interrogator promises a sus pect th at, if he confesses, he will not be ch arged at all or will be granted leniency. Based on th e advice provided in the leading interro gation manual, one of th e interrogator's goals is to convince the sus pect th at the police either already have or will be able to obtain evi dence th at establishes th e suspect's guilt.133 In this context, an innocent suspect might rationally conclude th at confessing in exchange for a promise of leniency is in his best interest. After hearing the police re peatedly state that they have or will have evidence of his guilt, the suspect might believe that, if he does not confess, the police intend ei ther to frame him for a crime he did not commit or to present genuine evidence that could result in conviction despite his innocence. An in nocent suspect might thus believe that a false confession in exchange for leniency is his best alternative.
Recent empirical data support the conclusion that threats of pun ishment and promises of leniency sometimes produce false confes sions. In their analysis of sixty proven or probable false confessions, Professors Richard A. Leo and Richard J. Ofshe identified this tactic as one that played a major role in precipitating several false confes sions. In one case, for example, a seventeen-year-old suspect falsely confessed to stabbing her mother after an interrogator told her she would die in th e electric ch air if sh e maintained her innocence.134 And in another, a young woman falsely confessed to shoving her boyfriend off a trail 320 feet above the Oregon coast after the police "creat[ ed] the impression that her admission ... carried no punishment."135
Both empirical data and precedent thus support imposing a prohi bition on inducing confessions through threats or promises. Since the prohibition's underlying purpose is to bar threats or promises that are substantially likely to produce untrustworthy confessions, the test should focus on the suspect's interpretation of th e interrogator's words rather than on whether the interrogator's words constitute an explicit threat or a binding promise. When the suspect would be likely to in terpret the interrogator's words as constituting a threat of serious ad verse consequences if he doesn't confess or a promise of significant le niency if he does, empirical data as well as intuition suggest that even an innocent suspect will be quite likely to confess rather than risk the 132. See, e.g., State v. Fuqua, 152 S.E.2d 68, 72 (N.C. 1967) (excluding confession be cause officer told suspect he would testify that the suspect cooperated with the investiga tion).
133. lNBAU ET AL., supra note 85, at 131.
134. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 65, at 475-76. 135 . Id. at 470-71. consequences of maintaining his innocence. To impose a restriction that will provide adequate protection against inducements that are substantially likely to produce untrustworthy confessions, interroga tors should thus be prohibited from making statements (or engaging in conduct) that would be likely to lead the suspect to believe that he will suffer serious adverse consequences if he doesn't confess or be granted significant leniency if he does.
Adopting this rule will not adversely affect law enforcement. The leading interrogation manuals admonish interrogators to refrain from inducing confessions through threats or promises of leniency.136 Thus interrogators who scrupulously adhere to the manuals' recommenda tions will not violate this rule. Moreover, the scope of the rule is lim ited. Promises to testify to the suspect's cooperation137 or to inform the prosecuting attorney of such cooperation138 would be permitted. Simi larly, statements to the effect that confession will make the suspect feel better or be good for his soul would not necessarily be impermis sible. The benefits offered by such promises seem either too insubstan tial or too collateral to the criminal litigation to be likely to induce an untrustworthy confession.
Determining whether an interrogator is threatening the suspect with a punishment if he doesn't confess or promising him significant leniency if he does will sometimes be difficult. As Professor Philip Johnson has said, "the difference between expressions of compassion ate understanding on the one hand, and implied promises of leniency on the other, is at the margins sometimes a matter of emphasis and nuance."139 Similarly, a fine line will sometimes exist between implied threats and statements that merely suggest the possibility of adverse consequences.
In determining whether an interrogator's statements to the suspect constitute a prohibited threat or promise, an objective standardwhich considers the probable perceptions of both the interrogator and the suspect subjected to interrogation -should be adopted. If the in terrogator should be aware that either the suspect or a reasonable per son in the suspect's position would perceive that the interrogator's statements indicate that the suspect would be likely to receive signifi-136. See, e.g., INBAU ET AL., supra note 85, at 114 ("In applying this technique of con demning the accomplice, the interrogator must proceed cautiously and must refrain from making any comments to the effect that the blame cast on an accomplice thereby relieves the suspect of legal responsibility for his part in the commission of the offense."). cant leniency if he did confess or significant adverse consequences if he didn't, then the interrogator's statements should be viewed as im proper and a confession occurring as a result of such statements should be excluded as involuntary.
137.
Examples drawn from two cases illustrate how the test should be applied. In Miller v. Fen ton, 1 40 Detective Boyce, who was investigating the murder of seventeen-year-old Deborah Margolin, interrogated Frank Miller for approximately one hour. During the course of the in terrogation, Boyce repeatedly suggested to Miller that, if he confessed, Boyce would see to it that he received "help" rather than being treated as a criminal. At one point, for example, Boyce told Miller that the person responsible for the killing was "not a criminal. "141 He went on to say that the perpetrator had "[a] problem, and a good thing about that Frank, is a problem can be rectified. "142 After Miller agreed, Boyce developed his implicit proposal to Miller as follows: "I want to help you. I mean I really want to help you, but you know what they say, God helps those who help themselves, Frank."143
Boyce was never explicit about the kind of "help" that he hoped to provide for Miller. At one point, however, he asked Miller, "If I promise to, you know, do all I can with the psychiatrist and everything, and we get the proper help for you, ... will you talk to me about it?"144 Miller never answered this question,145 and some of his responses to Boyce indicated that, despite Boyce's statements, he believed he would be treated as a criminal if he confessed.146 Nevertheless, Miller · eventually confessed to the killing.
Under the proposed approach, the first question is whether Boyce should be aware that a reasonable person in Miller's position would believe that, if he confessed, he would be likely to receive significant leniency. Although Boyce never explicitly promised Miller leniency in exchange for a confession, his statements taken as a whole would cer tainly suggest to a reasonable person that if he "helped" Boyce by confessing to the crime, he would not be treated as a criminal, but rather would receive the psychiatric help he needed. The promise of psychiatric help (presumably at a mental hospital) rather than pun ishment as a criminal certainly constitutes a promise of significant le- In determining whether a promise induced a confession, the focus should be on whether the promise played any part in precipitating the confession. If Miller did not believe that Boyce had made a promise or was certain that whatever promise Boyce made would not be kept, Miller's confession should be admitted. Miller's skepticism as to Boyce's intentions should not be sufficient, however, to negate a finding that the promise induced the confession. Even if Miller be lieved that Boyce was unlikely to honor his implied promise, he might have been induced by the promise to believe there was "a small open window at the top of [a] long wall"148 through which he could miracu lously escape the possibility of punishment. In the context of custodial interrogation, a suspect can be induced to confess by a promise even when he believes there is only a remote chance that the terms of the promise will be fulfilled.
Indeed, when a suspect's confession follows a promise of leniency, the conclusion that the promise did not induce the confession is gener ally implausible. Even if the suspect is aware that he is grasping at straws, the promise probably played some part in precipitating the confession. Barring unusual circumstances, such as an explicit clarifi cation of the officer's authority to make promises,149 a confession fol lowing such a promise should be viewed as induced by the promise and, therefore, involuntary.150 Since Miller's confession followed Boyce's implied promise of leniency, his confession should be ex cluded.
As a second example, consider the interrogation of Leo Bruce, who was suspected of murdering nine people at a Thai Buddhist Tem ple west of Phoenix, Arizona. After his arrest, Bruce was questioned by several officers, including FBI Agent Casey.151 Near the beginning 147. In Miller, the majority opinion took this position. 796 F.2d at 61 1-12.
148. See DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE 209 (1991 ) .
149. If, in response to a request for clarification, Boyce told Miller that he had no authority to make a promise that would be binding on the prosecutor, it could be found ei ther that Boyce made no implied promise of leniency or that the promise he did make did not induce Miller's confession.
150. Accord Dix, Promises, supra note 138, at 259.
151. See Roger Parloff, False Confessions, AM. LAW., May, 1993, at 58. of the interrogation, Casey falsely told Bruce that the police had evi dence showing that he was at the temple on the night of the killings. After Bruce denied ever being there, Casey said to him, "The best thing to do is to cooperate now .... Don't you think it's smart to get your version of the story down . . . before everybody else gives theirs?"152 When Bruce continued to deny he had been at the temple, Casey told Bruce that, if he stuck with that story, he was "gonna end up being sorry, I think."153 He added, "You're making a mistake by not cooperating at this point."154 Bruce continued to deny his involve ment. Eventually, however, he confessed to the killings.155
In this case, the critical question is whether Casey should have been aware that a reasonable person in Bruce's situation would be lieve that he was being threatened with significant adverse conse quences if he didn't confess. Casey's comments suggesting that it would be "smart" for Bruce to get his story down before other sus pects gave theirs could not reasonably be interpreted as communicat ing such a threat. The comments do, of course, suggest that Bruce will obtain some advantage by admitting his involvement so that he can get his "version of the story down" first. But there is no suggestion that getting his version down first will lead to any concrete benefit relating to the disposition of his case. At most, Casey's comments seem to sug gest that if Bruce tells his story before the others tell theirs, the authorities will be more likely to believe his story, thus making it less likely that other suspects will later be able to convince the authorities that Bruce is more blameworthy than his statement indicates.
Casey's additional statement to the effect that Bruce "will end up being sorry" if he doesn't cooperate obviously comes closer to articu lating a threat. Arguably, a reasonable person might take this lan guage to mean that serious adverse consequences would accrue to him if he failed to comply with the Agent's suggestion that he "cooperate" through making a statement admitting his involvement. On the other hand, when considered in the context of Casey's other statements, the suggestion that Bruce would be "sorry" if he didn't make a statement might more reasonably be interpreted as merely reinforcing the sug gestion contained in the earlier statements: if Bruce didn't provide the police with his own inculpatory statement, he might later regret his failure to cooperate because the police would then be more inclined to believe other suspects' statements incriminating Bruce. Even though the words, "You'll end up being sorry," have an ominous ring, they are 155. Id. Bruce was never brought to trial, however, because subsequently discovered evidence established that his confession was false. Id. not on the same order as, "You'll lose your chance for being treated as a lesser offender," or other words that might suggest that the failure to cooperate would lead to tangible consequences relating to sentencing or disposition of the case.
Although the question is close, Agent Casey's statements to Bruce should not be interpreted as communicating a threat that his failure to confess would lead to adverse consequences. Accordingly, Bruce's confession should not be involuntary on the ground that it was in duced by an improper threat or promise.
B. Threats of Adverse Consequences to a Friend or Loved One
In pre-Miranda due process cases, the Court's view of police trick ery was ambivalent. In a few cases -most notably, Sp ano v. Ne w York156 -the Court indicated that police trickery was a factor con tributing to its conclusion that the suspect's confession was involun tary .157 The Court never indicated, however, that any particular sort of police trickery would be sufficient by itself to render a confession in voluntary. Indeed, in Fra zier v. Cupp ,158 the Court held that a confes sion induced by trickery that both misrepresented the strength of the evidence against the suspect159 and minimized the suspect's culpability for the offense160 was voluntary.161 While stating that the interrogating officer's trickery was "relevant" under the due process test, it con cluded that the trickery was insufficient to render the confession in voluntary.162
156. 360 U.S. 315 (1959) .
157. See id. at 322-23. In Spano, the suspect's childhood friend, who was then a police officer, falsely told the suspect that his job would be in jeopardy if the suspect did not con fess. The Court condemned this tactic, observing that it was "a factor" that in conjunction with other factors resulted in an involuntary confession. See id. at 323. In Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 559 (1954) , the defendant, who was suffering from painful sinus headaches, requested the assistance of a doctor. The chief interrogator introduced him to a doctor who was supposed to provide the defendant with medical relief. See id. In fact, however, the "doctor" who met with the defendant "was not a general practitioner but a psychiatrist with considerable knowledge of hypnosis." Id. Instead of providing the defendant with medical relief, the "psychiatrist by subtle and suggestive questioning simply continued the police ef fort ... to induce [the suspect] to admit his guilt." Id. In holding the suspect's confession in voluntary, the Court treated this trickery as an important factor in the totality of circum stances. See id.
158. 394 U.S. 731 (1969) .
159. The interrogating officer falsely told the defendant that his confeder�te had con fessed. See id. at 737.
160. The officer also "sympathetically suggested that the victim had started a fight by making homosexual advances." Id. at 738.
161. See id. at 739.
See id.
Although the Court's dicta in Sp ano -which strongly condemned the deceptive tactics employed in that case163 -seemed to suggest that some types of police trickery are worse than others, the Court has never articulated any basis for evaluating the propriety of particular types of interrogators' trickery. Based on the concern for prohibiting interrogation tactics that are substantially likely to produce untrust worthy statements, the Court should distinguish between different forms of trickery on the basis of whether or not the trickery has the potential for producing a false confession. This approach is consistent with Sp ano because, as lower courts have pointed out, 164 the type of trickery employed in that case did have the potential for precipitating a false confession.
In Sp ano, Bruno, the defendant's childhood friend and a "fledg ling" police officer, falsely told the defendant that the defendant's failure to confess would cause him to lose his job as a police officer, resulting in dire consequences not only for himself but also for his wife and children. Bruno's trickery could be classified as informing the sus pect that a friend or loved one will suffer adverse consequences unless the suspect confesses. Both intuition and empirical data165 suggest that this type of trickery does have substantial potential for precipitating false confessions. In the context of a police interrogation,, a suspect might easily be led to feel that protecting his friend or loved one from imminent harm is more important than the future consequences of confessing. Based on an appropriate reading of Sp ano, interrogators should thus be prohibited from informing a suspect that his failure to confess will lead to serious adverse consequences for a friend or loved one.
If this prohibition is adopted, how should a court determine whether an interrogator is making a prohibited threat? Since the pro hibition is designed to deter a pernicious interrogation practice, the court's ultimate focus should be on the interrogator.166 In assessing 163. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959) .
164. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DuPree, 275 A.2d 326, 327 (Pa. 1971 ) (citing Sp ano as an example in which "police employ threats likely .to produce a false, involuntary confes sion").
165. In at least one of Leo and Ofshe's collection of "proven" false c<;mfession cases, this tactic seems to have played a critical part in producing a false confession. During Dante Parker's interrogation, the police indicated to Parker that if he didn't confess, ' the police would arrest and humiliate Parker's brothers, T.C. and Peter. One officer articulated the threat as follows: "They're gonna hit that house big time, T.C.'s gonna go down right in front of his kids.''. Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 24, at.230. According to Ofshe and Leo, this "threat precipitated Parker's false confession, and he began the process of invent ing answers to the interrogators' questions." Id.
166. Adopting an objective focus for the purpose of determining whether an interroga tion practice is impermissible is consistent with the Court's approach in dealing with other interrogation issues. See, e.g. , Berkemer v. McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (whether sus pect was in custody within the meaning of Miranda must be determined by assessing "how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation"); Rhode particular inducements, a reasonable interrogator's perception of how the suspect would view the inducement would be critical. If a reason able interrogator would believe that his inducement would cause the suspect to feel that he was confronted with the alternatives of con fessing or causing serious adverse consequences for a friend or loved one, the interrogator's inducement should be impermissible.
·
If an interrogator tells the suspect, for example, that the police will take his wife or friend into custody if he doesn't confess, the question of whether this constitutes a threat of serious adverse consequences to the suspect's wife or friend should be determined on the basis of the interrogator's perception of how the suspect would be likely to view this statement. If the interrogator knows that the suspect's wife suffers from arthritis, 167 then the interrogator should certainly be aware that the suspect would be likely to believe that the interrogator was trying to induce a confession by threatening his wife with serious adverse consequences. Similarly, if the interrogator had reason to believe that the suspect would be likely to believe that taking a person into custody amounts to an arrest or other serious curtailment of liberty, then the statement that his wife or a friend is going to be taken into custody should qualify as an impermissible threat, regardless of his wife's or friend's physical condition.
Since the interrogation tactic is problematic because of its potential for producing untrustworthy statements, it should not matter in theory whether the interrogator is misrepresenting his intentions when he tells a suspect that his failure to confess will lead to consequences for a third party. In practice, however, when the interrogator is lying to the suspect, there would seem to be a much greater likelihood that the in terrogator believes that the suspect would perceive that, if he doesn't confess, his friend or loved one would suffer serious adverse conse quences. In most instances, therefore, the interrogator's misrepresen tation as to the effect that a suspect's failure to confess would have for a third party should be strong evidence that the interrogator is em ploying an impermissible interrogation practice.
C. Misrepresenting the Evidence Against the Suspect
Misrepresenting the strength of the evidence against the suspect is another interrogation tactic that has the potential for producing false confessions. When confronted with an interrogator's claim that the evidence overwhelmingly establishes his guilt, some suspects will be inclined to believe either that continued resistance is futile (because Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (interrogation includes "words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect").
167. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 536 (1961) .
the police have evidence that will convict him despite his innocence) or that he is in fact guilty. Not every such misrepresentation, however, is likely to produce untrustworthy statements. If the police tell a sus pect they are confident they will find evidence establishing his guilt, or even that they have witnesses who will testify against him, an innocent suspect would be unlikely to confess. Even assuming he credits the in terrogator's statements, he would be inclined to believe that the police or the witnesses are simply mistaken. On the other hand, if the inter rogator shows the suspect a fabricated laboratory report indicating that the suspect's semen stains were found on the victim's under wear,168 an innocent suspect might rationally conclude that the gov ernment's irrefutable (even if mistaken) proof of his guilt mandates his confession.
When should the tactic of misrepresenting the evidence against the suspect be impermissible? In view of the concern for prohibiting inter rogation tactics substantially likely to produce untrustworthy state ments, the test should be whether the interrogators employed a tactic that would be likely to induce the suspect to believe that the evidence against him is so overwhelming that continued resistance is futile. When this test is met, there is a substantial risk that the suspect will simply make the statements sought by the interrogator, regardless of whether those statements are true. In determining whether this test is met, the court should consider the type of evidence misrepresented, the nature and quality of the misrepresentation, the extent to which the misrepresented evidence seems to establish the suspect's guilt, and the suspect's apparent vulnerability.
Misrepresentations relating to forensic or scientific evidence are particularly likely to convince suspects that further resistance is futile. Most people believe that evidence obtained through accepted scien tific procedures -fingerprints, ballistic reports, or DNA evidence, for example -is not only reliable, but irrefutable. Empirical data support this conclusion. Based on their examination of false confession cases, Ofshe and Leo report that "false evidence ploys based on scientific procedures" are more likely than "[f]alse evidence ploys based on eyewitness reports" to induce an innocent person to confess falsely.169 Both intuition and the available empirical data thus suggest that mis representing the forensic or scientific evidence against the suspect should in some circumstances be an impermissible interrogation tactic because of its potential for producing untrustworthy statements.170
Because scientific evidence has an inordinate potential for con vincing a suspect that continued resistance is futile, misrepresenting the scientific evidence against the suspect should be impermissible whenever the misrepresented evidence would be sufficient to establish the suspect's guilt. Under this test, interrogators should certainly be barred from fabricating laboratory reports indicating that semen stains on the victim's underwear came from the suspect. Since, in most cases, manufacturing a false report would not be necessary to convince a suspect of the scientific evidence's validity, falsely informing the sus pect of scientific evidence sufficient to establish his guilt -telling him, for example, that his fingerprints were found at the scene of the crime 171 or that his shoes matched tracks left by the perpetrator172 -should also be impermissible. In both instances the interrogator's statements would be likely to lead an innocent suspect to believe that irrefutable proof of his guilt mandated his confession.
The tactic of falsely informing a suspect that he has failed a poly graph test presents a more difficult issue. An interrogator employing this tactic is misrepresenting scientific evidence; but the deception does not suggest to the suspect that the police will be able to present irrefutable proof of his guilt. A knowledgeable suspect would pre sumably be aware that polygraph results can be mistaken and that such results are not admissible in court. Nevertheless, empirical data indicate that this form of deception can have a powerful impact on in nocent suspects. The Leo-Ofshe study of false confession cases indi cates that, in at least two cases, 173 misrepresenting polygraph results played a major role not only in precipitating an innocent suspect's con fession but also in leading the suspect to believe, at least temporarily, that he was in fact guilty.
Since the constitutional prohibition should only apply to exclude interrogation tactics substantially likely to produce untrustworthy statements, the tactic of misrepresenting polygraph results should 170. In Cayward, the court distinguished between verbal misrepresentations and "manu facturing false documents" for the purpose of misrepresenting the strength of the govern ment's case, stating that neither the suspect's nor the public's expectations "encompass the notion that the police will knowingly fabricate tangible documentation or physical evidence against an individual." 552 So. 2d at 974. In particular, the court expressed the concern that "[a] report falsified for interrogation purposes might well be retained and filed in police pa perwork," with the result that they might unintentionally "be admitted as substantive evi dence against the defendant." Id. at 974-75. 173. The two cases involved Peter Reilly, who falsely confessed to killing his mother, and Tom Sawyer, who falsely confessed to killing a young woman who lived near him. For a discussion of these cases, see White, Fa lse Confessions, supra note 82, at 128.
probably not be absolutely prohibited. As this example indicates, however, any tactic that distorts the suspect's perception of the scien tific or forensic evidence relating to his participation in the crime does have some tendency to precipitate a false or untrustworthy statement. When such a tactic is employed, the court should at least closely scru tinize both the circumstances of the interrogation and the apparent vulnerability of the suspect, examining the extent to which the misrep resentation would be likely to precipitate an untrustworthy confession. When the tactic has been employed on a youthful or mentally handi capped suspect, for example, a court should conclude that the interro gator's use of the tactic rendered the suspect's confession involuntary.
In determining whether a particular misrepresentation of govern ment evidence will be impermissible, the extent and nature of the mis representation is also significant. In Miranda, the Court disapproved of the "reverse line-up" tactic. In a reverse line-up, the "accused is placed in a line-up" and then falsely "identified by several fictitious witnesses or victims who associated him with different offenses."174 When police employ this tactic, there is obviously a concern that even innocent suspects "will become desperate and confess to the offense under investigation in order to escape from the false accusations."175 If, rather than conducting a "reverse line-up," the police simply ar ranged to have a number of fictitious witnesses dramatically identify the suspect as the perpetrator of the crime under investigation, the tactic should still be impermissible. Even though suspects can be ex pected to know that witnesses are often mistaken, the power of the false evidence -in terms of both its apparent value to the prosecution and its vivid communication to the suspect -could easily convince an innocent suspect that continued resistance would be futile.
Although the test may prove difficult to apply, it should promote distinctions between reasonable and pernicious police practices. In Leo Bruce's interrogation, for example, the police took Bruce to a property room, showing him "photographs of enlarged fingerprints and other items of trace evidence, a floor plan of the temple, and a chart listing the names of Bruce's alleged associates."176 If Bruce's in terrogators had falsely indicated that Bruce's fingerprints were found at the crime scene, this interrogation tactic should be impermissible. If, on the other hand, they falsely asserted that the forensic evidence, such as the fingerprints, established the guilt of Bruce's alleged associ ates, but they said nothing about whether it established Bruce's par ticipation, the tactic should be permissible. 176. Parloff, supra note 151, at 60. that interrogation practices viewed as pernicious by society are pro hibited, constitutional restrictions on such practices are minimal.
In order to address this problem, the Court first needs to deter mine what interrogation practices should be viewed as pernicious, and then to develop constitutional principles that will prohibit or restrain such practices. In this Article, I have argued that the Court should re furbish the due process voluntariness test so as to prohibit interroga tion practices that are substantially likely to produce untrustworthy , statements. By taking this approach, the Court will not only fill a sig nificant gap left by Miranda but also come closer to insuring that "the terrible engine of the criminal law ... not be used to overreach indi viduals who stand helpless against it."178
